Life On Mars - The Clanger Take
Feb. 11th, 2007 09:06 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
major_clangerLife On Mars is about to return (hurrah!) and we're being promised that we will finally get a resolution to the question of just what is happening to Sam. But will it be one that will satisfy the sf geeks?
There are three common explanations given for Sam Tyler's experience (and indeed, stated by Sam in his brief opening narration):
1) Sam is in 2006, where he is dreaming that he is in 1973. Evidence for this is that he keeps on hearing sounds from the present and experiencing surreal events.
2) Sam is in 1973, where he has a delusion that he is from 2006. Evidence for this is the apparent reality of his situation combined with delusional events such has having people on the TV conversing with him. However, as viewers we are privileged to know that Sam's 2006 is indeed 'our' 2006, and that his (for 1973) futuristic techniques and ideas are accurate.
3) Sam is in 1973, but was indeed in 2006 - in other words, everything is as it seems, but there has been a Big Fantastical Event. But this seems more than simple time travel - Sam seems to have arrived in a role that has been somehow established for him.
I suggest that there is a fourth explanation that makes sufficient sense that if I found myself in Sam's position I would firmly assume it to be the truth.
Philosopher Nick Bostrom has advanced the "Simulation Argument", based on the following set of propositions:
Either:
- intelligent races will never reach a level of technology where they can run simulations of reality so detailed they can be mistaken for reality; or
- races who do reach such a level do not tend to run such simulations; or
- we are almost certainly living in such a simulation.
Bostrom's point is that if the first and second propositions are false then there will be such simulations, in which case there are likely to be vast numbers of such simulations including very many recreations or alternative versions of the past. If this is indeed the case, there is one 'original' universe and a near-inifinite number of varied simulations of it, so in all likelihood we live in one of the latter.
And this leads me to Bradshaw's Corollary to the Simulation Argument: the weirder your world is, the more likely it is to be a simulation. Occam's Razor is often deployed to attack the Simulation Argument, but this only valid if the 'simulated reality' explanation is more complex than the 'single real world' one. If deeply strange events start to take place - and we exclude personal delusion - then what is now the simpler explanation: that the 'real world' is no longer bound by laws of physics or causation, or that someone is fiddling with a software simulation?
The best explanation for Sam Tyler's experience is not that it is 1973, or 2006, but some far-distant future, or at least a date the other side of the Singularity. Sam was in a simulation of 2006, but somehow he has been pasted into a simulation of 1973, perhaps even overwriting an alternative Sam Tyler who was resident in that simulation. But somehow a link between the two simulations remains, hence the leakage of information (Sam's 'voices') from one into the other. Why has this happened? It could be an accident, an experiment, or even some sort of prank. Sam might even be right in his suspicion that it is some sort of test; he is, in sfnal terms, in a godgame narrative, trying to fulfil the requirements of some unseen higher authority with power over his world.
I don't think this will turn out to be the explanation used - even if the writers could get it across clearly, it would come over either as a massive cop-out or as a simple rip-off of The Matrix. But if it did, it might offer an intriguing resolution: if Sam became aware of his situation, might he be offered a choice of which simulation to continue in? (Although if this hypothesis were true, he could quite validly continue in both.)
For my part, I regard the Simulation Argument as credible in an abstract way but not something to lose sleep over. Even if we do live in a simulation, then so long as it remains rational, internally self-consistent and unaffected by external influences, it might as well be the 'real world' so one should act on the basis that it is. But if I ever wake up in 1973, I'm definitely assuming that I'm software. It's just the simplest explanation, after all.
There are three common explanations given for Sam Tyler's experience (and indeed, stated by Sam in his brief opening narration):
1) Sam is in 2006, where he is dreaming that he is in 1973. Evidence for this is that he keeps on hearing sounds from the present and experiencing surreal events.
2) Sam is in 1973, where he has a delusion that he is from 2006. Evidence for this is the apparent reality of his situation combined with delusional events such has having people on the TV conversing with him. However, as viewers we are privileged to know that Sam's 2006 is indeed 'our' 2006, and that his (for 1973) futuristic techniques and ideas are accurate.
3) Sam is in 1973, but was indeed in 2006 - in other words, everything is as it seems, but there has been a Big Fantastical Event. But this seems more than simple time travel - Sam seems to have arrived in a role that has been somehow established for him.
I suggest that there is a fourth explanation that makes sufficient sense that if I found myself in Sam's position I would firmly assume it to be the truth.
Philosopher Nick Bostrom has advanced the "Simulation Argument", based on the following set of propositions:
Either:
- intelligent races will never reach a level of technology where they can run simulations of reality so detailed they can be mistaken for reality; or
- races who do reach such a level do not tend to run such simulations; or
- we are almost certainly living in such a simulation.
Bostrom's point is that if the first and second propositions are false then there will be such simulations, in which case there are likely to be vast numbers of such simulations including very many recreations or alternative versions of the past. If this is indeed the case, there is one 'original' universe and a near-inifinite number of varied simulations of it, so in all likelihood we live in one of the latter.
And this leads me to Bradshaw's Corollary to the Simulation Argument: the weirder your world is, the more likely it is to be a simulation. Occam's Razor is often deployed to attack the Simulation Argument, but this only valid if the 'simulated reality' explanation is more complex than the 'single real world' one. If deeply strange events start to take place - and we exclude personal delusion - then what is now the simpler explanation: that the 'real world' is no longer bound by laws of physics or causation, or that someone is fiddling with a software simulation?
The best explanation for Sam Tyler's experience is not that it is 1973, or 2006, but some far-distant future, or at least a date the other side of the Singularity. Sam was in a simulation of 2006, but somehow he has been pasted into a simulation of 1973, perhaps even overwriting an alternative Sam Tyler who was resident in that simulation. But somehow a link between the two simulations remains, hence the leakage of information (Sam's 'voices') from one into the other. Why has this happened? It could be an accident, an experiment, or even some sort of prank. Sam might even be right in his suspicion that it is some sort of test; he is, in sfnal terms, in a godgame narrative, trying to fulfil the requirements of some unseen higher authority with power over his world.
I don't think this will turn out to be the explanation used - even if the writers could get it across clearly, it would come over either as a massive cop-out or as a simple rip-off of The Matrix. But if it did, it might offer an intriguing resolution: if Sam became aware of his situation, might he be offered a choice of which simulation to continue in? (Although if this hypothesis were true, he could quite validly continue in both.)
For my part, I regard the Simulation Argument as credible in an abstract way but not something to lose sleep over. Even if we do live in a simulation, then so long as it remains rational, internally self-consistent and unaffected by external influences, it might as well be the 'real world' so one should act on the basis that it is. But if I ever wake up in 1973, I'm definitely assuming that I'm software. It's just the simplest explanation, after all.
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